The video shows the work of route-clearance teams in Afghanistan.
This video has been included because researchers can see plenty of examples of realistic field conditions under which explosive-ordnance clearance is being done in Afghanistan. It is essential for researchers to have an accurate appreciation of the real field conditions before considering expensive research projects.
It is also essential that researchers understand how easily insurgent forces can adapt and defeat technological solutions that have cost tens of millions of dollars to develop. Read the caption below carefully and then watch the video with this in mind.
Better-quality blast-protected vehicles provide the teams with more confidence to handle challenging tasks.
You will also see that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by insurgents are typically made from the unexploded ordnance (UXO) which the demining teams are trying to remove. Between 15% (typical failure rate for high quality US-made ammunition) and 70% (old Russian-designed ammunition) fail to explode when used.
These UXOs lie in the ground in a, at best, semi-stable state, so some easily exploded accidentally at times.
Insurgents collect and attempt to disarm them, then set them up with remotely operated or vehicle-triggered detonation fuses. That is why the demining teams came to be seen as legitimate targets by insurgents, because they were removing the explosive devices the insurgency needed to fight people who they regarded as legitimate enemies.
Although not explicitly acknowledged in the commentary, this video also demonstrates one of the many methods used by insurgents to adapt their techniques to defeat the highly advanced technologies available to the ISAF teams. By laying multiple devices in different locations, using different triggering devices and different deployment methods, the insurgents soon learned what the ISAF teams could and could not detect.
Every blast indicated a device that was not detected in advance by the ISAF team. Every device removed by the team indicated a device that was detected. In this way, the insurgents rapidly learned how to deploy undetectable devices that maximized their destructive power.
